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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Lisa Tapp’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint arises from a medical procedure in 
2008, and was filed long after the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act’s (“UHMA”) four-
year repose period expired.  See Utah Code § 78B-3-404(1) (“A malpractice action … 
shall be commenced within two years after [discovery of the injury,] but not to exceed 
four years after the date of the alleged act.”).  She alleges that Dr. Sherman Sorensen, an 
independent cardiologist,1 performed an unnecessary surgical closure of a small hole in 
her heart known as a “PFO” (patent foramen ovale).  For Plaintiff’s claims to survive, she 
must demonstrate that her claims were affirmatively fraudulently concealed from her by 
each of the defendants she has sued.  See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2)(b).  
Plaintiff initially filed her Complaint against Intermountain and the Sorensen 
defendants in August 2017, alleging various fraud-based and negligence claims against 
all defendants.2  Plaintiff expressly alleged that her PFO closure occurred in September 
2008, almost nine years before she filed suit.  She recognized her claims were untimely 
and included a section in her Complaint titled “Equitable Tolling/Fraudulent 
Concealment.”  However, because the date of Plaintiff’s tolling allegations failed to 
include facts satisfying the UHMA repose period’s affirmative fraudulent concealment 
                                                          
1 While Dr. Sorensen had privileges to practice at both Intermountain and St. Mark’s 
facilities, he was not an employee or agent of Intermountain or St. Mark’s, the other 
hospital entity involved in the two other cases on appeal.  
2 Plaintiff also alleged a federal RICO claim, which she later voluntarily withdrew.  See 
R.00118 n.4. 
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exception,3 Intermountain moved to dismiss her claims as untimely under Rule 12(b)(6).  
In response, the district court allowed Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint 
(“FAC”).  However, the FAC suffered from the same deficiency, and Intermountain 
again moved to dismiss, leading to the ruling at issue on appeal in Plaintiff’s case.   
Unfortunately, while the district court recognized the FAC still failed to make any 
allegations of affirmative fraudulent concealment, it incorrectly concluded that it was 
procedurally barred from “rul[ing] on the statute of limitation/repose defense” at the 
pleading stage because it believed “Plaintiff [wa]s not obligated to plead with 
particularity in her complaint facts in response to the statute of limitation/repose 
defense.”  R.00734.  The district court then ruled Plaintiff could proceed with bifurcated 
discovery regarding Intermountain’s possible (but unpled) “affirmative fraudulent 
concealment” of Plaintiff’s claims, despite Plaintiff’s failure to plead such allegations, let 
alone with Rule 9(c)’s required particularity.  R.00753–56, R.00759–62.4   
Contrary to the district court’s finding, because Plaintiff’s FAC is facially 
untimely, Rule 12(b)(6) obligates her to plead an exception to the UHMA’s repose period 
for her claims to survive.  And in her case, the potentially applicable exception to the 
UHMA’s repose period requires her to plead facts demonstrating that Intermountain 
affirmatively fraudulently concealed her claims from her, allegations that must satisfy 
Rule 9(c)’s particularity requirements.  Plaintiff has not, and cannot do this, as is 
                                                          
3 See Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b). 
4 The district court also welcomed guidance from the appellate courts, recommending the 
Court grant the currently pending interlocutory appeal.  Id.   
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highlighted by the district court’s own correct application of Rule 9(c) to Plaintiff’s 
affirmative claims of fraud (rather than her tolling allegations), claims the district court 
recognized were subject to Rule 12.  In dismissing these claims, the district court held 
that the FAC contains no factual allegation of an “act of fraud by [Intermountain].”   
If the district court’s procedural error is left uncorrected, particularly in light of its 
recognition Plaintiff completely failed to allege that Intermountain affirmatively 
fraudulently concealed anything, Intermountain will be forced to submit to full fraud 
discovery of yet-to-be-pled fraud allegations.  Such a result runs counter to Utah’s 
established case law on Rule 12’s application, Rule 9’s plain language, and the 
underlying policy of Rule 9, which serves to prevent parties from using the broad powers 
of discovery to find facts they are required to have pled at the outset.  Accordingly, 
Intermountain asks this Court to correct the district court’s erroneous application of Rules 
12(b)(6) and 9(c) and dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining stale claims against Intermountain 
with prejudice.    
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 Issue No. 1: Did the district court err by holding that, under Rule 12(b)(6) and 9(c), 
Plaintiff’s FAC should not be dismissed and fraud discovery should proceed with respect 
to Intermountain, despite the FAC’s facial untimeliness and its failure to include any 
factual allegation that Intermountain “affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal [its] 
alleged misconduct”? 
 Standard of Review: Denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is reviewed for 
correctness.  Jacobsen Const. Co., Inc. v. Teton Builders, 2005 UT 4, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 719.  
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The interpretation of rules of procedure (Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(c)) and their application is 
a question of law reviewed for correctness.  Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, ¶ 7, 250 P.3d 48. 
Preservation of Issue: Intermountain preserved this issue below on multiple 
occasions.  See R.00349–61, R.00358–71; R.00054–57, R.00063–71. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Intermountain and Dr. Sorensen in August 
2017, based on her PFO closure which occurred in September 2008.  R.00001.  
Intermountain moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s initial Complaint as facially untimely under 
the UHMA’s four-year statute of repose.  Mot. to Dismiss, R.00050.  Thereafter, Plaintiff 
requested and was granted permission to file her FAC.  R.00149; R. 00317; R. 00122.   
In her FAC, Plaintiff again pled that she received negligent medical care in 2008, 
nearly nine years before commencing legal proceedings in 2017.  R.00132–37 at ¶¶ 37, 
39–42, 45, 48.  Plaintiff alleges Dr. Sorensen fraudulently induced her to undergo a PFO 
closure in 2008 at an Intermountain facility.  R.00134 at ¶ 43.  Plaintiff further alleges Dr. 
Sorensen’s medical records at that time contain “fraudulent misrepresentations, 
falsehoods, and other misleading statements.”  R.00135 at ¶ 44.  The FAC contains no 
factual allegation of affirmative fraud by Intermountain, but instead contains several 
allegations that Intermountain disclosed information to patients regarding when PFO 
closure is medically necessary.  See generally R.00122–146; R.00736; R.00753–56; 
R.00311–13; R.00130–32 at ¶¶ 32–34 (alleging publication of Intermountain “Fact 
Sheets” and web pages stating that “PFO Closure has not been found to reliably reduce 
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migraines” and “there is no conclusive evidence that fixing a PFO will benefit 
migraines”).   
Despite the absence of any allegation of affirmative fraudulent concealment 
against Intermountain, Plaintiff alleged the legal conclusion that her claims against 
Intermountain are saved from untimeliness under the affirmative fraudulent concealment 
provision in Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b).  R.00146 at ¶ 108 (“Defendants’ affirmative 
acts and omissions, before, during, and/or after their actions causing Plaintiff’s injury 
prevented Plaintiff from discovering the injury or cause thereof until recently in 2017.  
Such conduct tolls the limitations pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-
3-404(b) [sic].”).   
Intermountain again moved to dismiss the FAC’s facially untimely claims, which 
still failed to allege Intermountain “affirmative[ly]” acted to fraudulently prevent Plaintiff 
from timely pursuing her claims within the four-year repose period.5  See R.00347. 
Disposition Below 
 On August 9, 2018, the district court resolved Intermountain’s motion, agreeing with 
Intermountain’s substantive arguments regarding the application of the UHMA’s statute 
of repose and its exception in section 78B-3-404(2)(b).  R.00736–37; R.00747–56.  The 
district court further acknowledged the FAC contains no allegation of an “affirmative act 
of fraud by [Intermountain],” R.00754, and dismissed Plaintiff’s affirmative fraud-based 
                                                          
5 The district court expressly permitted Defendants to file motions to dismiss the FAC, 
but also ordered that Defendants file answers to the FAC “so that the case may proceed,” 
R.00316, which Intermountain did on April 16, 2018 shortly after filing its Motion to 
Dismiss the FAC, R.00499. 
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claims against Intermountain.  R.00736–37.  The district court also dismissed Plaintiff’s 
affirmative claim of conspiracy against all defendants “[h]aving dismissed the underlying 
predicate for the conspiracy claim (i.e., the fraud claim),” leaving only her negligence 
claims against Intermountain.  R.00737.  The district court reasoned: 
The allegations of [Intermountain’s] fraud in inducing Ms. Tapp to have 
surgery are non-existent.  There is nothing but conclusory statements where 
the plaintiff lumps the “defendants” in together and there is not one fact in 
the complaint that would support that [Intermountain] was somehow 
involved in a fraud in 2008.  There is no fact stated in the complaint that 
even alleges, let alone with any degree of particularity, as required under 
Rule 9, U.R.C.P., that [Intermountain] was involved in a fraud on Plaintiff 
in 2008. 
 
R.00736 (emphasis in original).6   
The district court also correctly held that the narrow exception to the four-year 
repose period within § 78B-3-404(2)(b) requires not just allegations of “‘fraudulent 
concealment’ (which, in normal parlance, might encompass silence in the face of a duty 
to disclose) but a much narrower ‘affirmative act to fraudulently conceal.’”  R.00754.  
This is because “the legislature intended that only the ‘affirmative act’ branch of 
fraudulent concealment – and not concealment by silence – would apply as an exception 
under the statute.”  R.00755.7  After finding that Plaintiff had adequately alleged a 
                                                          
6 The district court also recognized that the singular fraud properly alleged in Plaintiff’s 
complaints concerns alleged misrepresentations by Dr. Sorensen in 2008 that induced 
Plaintiff to have the PFO procedure and thereafter Dr. Sorensen “perpetuat[ed] that 
falsehood by his silence.”  R.00751–52; R.00312 (citing R.00134–35 at ¶¶ 43–44).  
These allegations, however, involve only Dr. Sorensen.  See id. 
7 In making this finding, the district court noted the legislature’s codification of its 
“Legislative Findings and Declarations” regarding the UHMA.  R.00748.  The court 
stated the UHMA “was borne out of the legislatures’ concern that increasing malpractice 
claims had resulted in ‘substantial increases’ in medical malpractice insurance, and the 
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scheme of affirmative fraudulent concealment on the part of Dr. Sorensen,8 the court 
acknowledged that with regard to Intermountain “Plaintiff has a much steeper hill to 
climb to avail [herself] of the statutory exception at issue,” having pled “no [fraud] facts 
… let alone facts with a level of particularity[] to support a claim against 
[Intermountain].”  R.00753–54. 
The district court also held that to toll the repose period through affirmative 
concealment fraud, a particular defendant’s conduct must “cause … a plaintiff’s inability 
to have discover[ed] the alleged misconduct by [that] provider.”  R.00756.9   
                                                          
resulting ‘increased health care costs’ which are then passed through to the patient.”  
R.00749.  The court also recognized the legislature “intended to curtail individual 
malpractice cases in the ‘public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage 
private insurance companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance’” 
and that the periods for timely pursuing claims are statutorily recognized “to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care providers while 
limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums 
can be reasonably and accurately calculated.”  Id. (quoting § 78B-2-402(2)) (emphasis 
in original). 
8 In finding fraud allegations against Dr. Sorensen sufficient, the district court rejected 
the argument that section 78B-3-404(2)(b) “implicitly requires some later affirmative act 
of fraud that kept Plaintiff from discovering the wrongfulness of his actions,” which 
Plaintiff had not alleged as to either Defendant.  See R.00752 (emphasis in original) 
(“[Dr. Sorensen’s] fraudulent misrepresentation at the outset, followed by years of 
perpetuating that falsehood by his silence, meets the standard for fraudulent concealment 
under the statute.”). 
9 The district court held that under § 78B-3-404(2)(b), a plaintiff who asserts a claim after 
the four-year repose period must prove the following: 
1. That the provider “affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct”; 
2. That, as a result, the plaintiff was prevented from discovering the provider’s 
misconduct during the repose period; and 
3. That plaintiff filed her claim within one year of (actually or constructively) 
discovering concealment. 
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However, rather than dismiss the FAC, given this factual void and the exacting 
requirements of the UHMA’s repose exception, the district court accepted as sufficient 
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that “Defendants’ … conduct tolls the limitations 
pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b) [sic].”  R.00146 at ¶ 108; 
R.00734.  The district court did so based on its holding that Plaintiff was not obligated, 
under Rule 12, to plead an exception to the UHMA’s repose period to maintain her 
facially untimely claims.  R.00734.  The court then ordered bifurcated discovery on the 
limited issue of the currently unpled affirmative fraudulent concealment of Plaintiff’s 
claims.  R.00747.  
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
  Despite finding that Plaintiff’s FAC contains no allegation of an “affirmative act 
of fraud by [Intermountain],” R.00754, the district court refused to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
negligence claims against Intermountain based on its misapplication of Rules 12(b)(6) 
and 9(c).  The district court’s erroneous interpretation of these rules should be corrected 
and made consistent with settled Utah law, which holds that a facially untimely complaint 
is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the plaintiff affirmatively pleads an 
exception to the applicable statute of limitations or repose.  And when that exception 
involves a fraudulent act on the part of the defendant, like Utah Code § 78B-3-404(2)(b), 
such fraudulent acts—as with all allegations of fraud—must be pled with particularity 
under Rule 9(c).  Intermountain accordingly requests that this Court reverse the district 
                                                          
R.00751 (emphasis in original). 
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court’s procedural error in interpreting Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(c) and, given the lack of 
any allegations sufficient to save her facially untimely claims, dismiss Plaintiff’s claims 
against Intermountain with prejudice.  
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT WAS 
PROCEDURALLY BARRED FROM DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S FAC AS 
UNTIMELY UNDER RULE 12(b)(6). 
  
The district court’s holding that it could not dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claims 
at the pleading stage because not all the “facts of fraudulent concealment” were in 
Plaintiff’s FAC10 misapplies Rule 12.  R.00734.   As addressed below, Utah precedent 
makes Rule 12(b)(6) applicable to facially untimely complaints, and the UHMA’s repose 
period is facially applicable to the FAC, which alleges the date of care at issue.  
A. Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal of a facially untimely complaint. 
   
In Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d 947, this 
Court recognized that in some cases “the existence of [an] affirmative defense may 
appear within the complaint itself.”  Id.  “‘A complaint showing that the statute of 
limitations has run on the claims is the most common situation in which the affirmative 
defense appears on the face of the pleading [and] inclusion of dates in the complaint 
                                                          
10 To the contrary, Plaintiff clearly attempted to allege that the statute of repose should be 
tolled based on fraudulent concealment.  Plaintiff dedicated an entire section of the FAC 
to “Equitable Tolling/Fraudulent Concealment,” in which she alleges, in conclusory 
fashion, that “Defendants’” conduct “tolls the limitations period pursuant to the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act 78B-3-404(b) [sic].”  R.00145–46.  As the district court 
correctly acknowledged, these allegations as to Intermountain are entirely conclusory and 
include no affirmative acts of fraudulent concealment on Intermountain’s part.  R.00754. 
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indicating that the action is untimely renders its subject to dismissal for failure to state a 
claim’ … under Rule 12(b)(6).”  Id. (emphasis added).  In Tucker the complaint did not 
allege the date that an insurance company refused to pay, but “[h]ad this date been 
specified by the [plaintiffs], the allegations of the complaint itself would have clearly 
demonstrated that the [plaintiffs’] claim was time barred, rendering the motion to dismiss 
an appropriate procedural vehicle for raising the statute of limitations.”  Id. at ¶ 9.11 
Here, Plaintiff alleges she received negligent medical care in 2008, far more than 
four years before commencing legal proceedings in 2017.  R.00132–37 at ¶¶ 37, 39–42, 
45, 48.  Because Plaintiff alleges the dates of her care and the UHMA includes a four-
year period of repose that is dependent only on the date of care,12 “the allegations of the 
complaint itself … have clearly demonstrated that the [Plaintiff’s] claim [is] time barred, 
rendering the motion to dismiss an appropriate procedural vehicle for raising the statute 
of [repose].”  Tucker, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 9. 
Several Utah appellate decisions have upheld Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals when 
complaints facially establish an affirmative defense, including where plaintiffs have 
inadequately attempted to plead around facial untimeliness.  Most recently, in Young 
Resources Ltd. Partnership v. Promontory Landfill LLC, 2018 UT App 99, 2018 WL 
2470958, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of untimely 
claims because “the face of the complaint … establish[es] that the claims are time-barred 
                                                          
11 Because the trial court in Tucker had to go outside the complaint’s allegations to 
determine the date of the refusal to pay, this Court upheld dismissal under a converted 
motion for summary judgment.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
12 See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(1) 
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[and the plaintiff failed to offer] a factual basis for tolling the statute.”  Id. at ¶ 31 (citing 
Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041, n.4 (10th Cir. 1980) and Butler v. 
Deutsche Morgan Grentell, Inc., 140 N.M. 111, ¶ 33, 140 P.3d 532 (2006)); Mast v. First 
Madison Servs., Inc., 2009 UT App 162, 2009 WL 1709017, at *1 n.2 (“Dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) … is appropriate where the claim is time-barred based on the allegations of 
the complaint itself” and finding equitable discovery allegations insufficient); Lowery v. 
Brigham Young Univ., 2004 UT App 182, 2004 WL 1368173 (affirming dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) based on facial untimeliness and finding allegations of tolling based upon 
alleged mental illness to be inadequately pled); see also Bivens v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
2017 UT 67, ¶ 54 n.6, 416 P.3d 338 (affirming dismissal because complaint facially pled 
the absence of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an affirmative defense). 
In Russell Packard Devel., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741, this Court 
applied the same analysis to test the untimeliness of a pleading.  The plaintiff avoided 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, but only because the plaintiff’s allegations “made a prima facie 
showing of fraudulent concealment.”  Id. at ¶¶ 13, 40.  Notably, this Court in Tucker cited 
to federal authority, as it does frequently,13 for the proposition that dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) is procedurally proper when a complaint facially alleges that a limitations period 
has run, and tolling allegations are not adequately pled in accordance with Rule 9.  
Tucker, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8 (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
                                                          
13 See Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 12 n.1, 104 P.3d 1226 
(recognizing that Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) is identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) and when 
Utah case law is absent “we ‘freely resort to federal law as a useful guide.’”) (quoting 
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 741 n.9 (Utah 1990)). 
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Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 345 (2d ed. 1990)).  Federal authority on this point 
appears to be uniform.14 
Contrary to this established procedural law, the district court here found Rule 12 
inapplicable to Plaintiff’s facially untimely negligence allegations, concluding that 
Plaintiff need not plead facts to overcome the facial untimeliness she alleges regarding 
her dates of care because “the facts of fraudulent concealment are not in the complaint 
and can’t be unless the issue is before the Court in full.”15  R.00734.  No authority is cited 
to support the district court’s circular statement regarding what facts Plaintiff would need 
to plead in order to rule under Rule 12(b)(6) on a statute of repose.  See id.  And, contrary 
                                                          
14 See Boettcher v. Conoco Phillips Co., 721 Fed. Appx. 823, 824-25 (10th Cir. 2018) 
(affirming dismissal because untimeliness is evident from allegations and tolling is 
supported only by a “conclusory statement as to the application of [tolling without 
relevant] factual allegations”); Lee v. Rocky Mtn. UFCW Unions and Employers Trust, 13 
P.3d 405, *1 (10th Cir. 1993) (limitations defense “may be appropriately resolved on a 
12(b)(6) motion [because] the dates given in the complaint make clear that the right sued 
upon had been extinguished”); Ballen v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 23 F.3d 335, 
336–37 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal based on facial untimeliness and 
because plaintiff “has not adequately alleged fraudulent concealment to toll the 
limitations period”); Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 119–20 (9th Cir. 
1980) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal based on facial untimeliness and because plaintiff did 
not meet obligation to “plead with particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of 
fraudulent concealment”); Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877, 879–80 (8th Cir. 
2011) (“once it is clear from the face of the complaint that an action is [untimely plaintiff 
must] meet his burden of sufficiently pleading that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment 
saves his otherwise time-barred claims”); Adams v. Am. Med. System, Inc., 2014 WL 
1670090, at *2 (D. Utah April 28, 2014) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where the complaint’s 
dates made clear that the right sued upon has extinguished and the plaintiff fails to come 
forward with a factual basis to toll); Warnick v. McCotter, 2003 WL 23355718, at *3–4 
(D. Utah Dec. 29, 2008) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where dates in complaint made clear 
that claim was untimely and assertion of fraudulent concealment was unsupported). 
15 See supra n.10. 
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to the district court’s statement, the on-point cases in Utah and elsewhere all recognize 
that the only fact necessary to permit dismissal based on untimeliness is the date that 
initiates the statutory period of repose or limitation.  See Tucker, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8 (dates 
in complaint); Young Resources, 2018 UT App 99, ¶ 31 (same); Mast, 2009 UT App 162, 
at *1 (same); Lowery, 2004 UT App 182, at *1 (same); supra n.9 (citing federal cases 
referencing dates in complaints).   
B. The UHMA’s repose period is facially applicable to Plaintiff’s FAC.   
 
Critically, when a repose rather than a limitation period is at issue, the only 
relevant date is the date the repose period begins because “accrual,” “discovery,” and 
other similar concepts are not part of a repose analysis.16  When that date is alleged on the 
face of a complaint, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of alleging a basis for tolling that 
will save her claims.  In short, if a plaintiff pleads herself out of court, she must also 
plead facts supporting an exception letting her back in.  And in this case, as addressed in 
Section II infra, she must do so with particularity under Rule 9(c).  Young Resources 
addressed this procedural question.  The Utah Court of Appeals recognized that if a 
complaint’s facially untimely allegations cannot trigger dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a 
                                                          
16 Repose periods as found in § 78B-3-404(1) serve the important public policy of ending 
the possibility of claims irrespective of accrual or injury.  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 
S. Ct. 2175, 2182–83 (2014) (“[s]tatutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a 
defendant should be free from liability after the legislatively determined period of time”); 
Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 189 
(Utah 1989) (“Statutes of repose promote the public goal of certainty and finality … and 
terminate liability at a set time.”); Jensen v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2018 UT 27, 
¶ 18, 424 P.3d 885 (confirming § 78B-3-404(1) contains a repose period running from 
the date of care). 
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statute of limitations defense that is subject to the discovery rule could never be 
successfully asserted in a motion to dismiss, and that is clearly not the rule.”  2018 UT 
App 99, ¶ 31 (quoting Butler) (emphasis added).   
Here, Plaintiff put repose untimeliness at issue by alleging that the negligent 
medical care occurred in 2008.  R.00132–37 at ¶¶ 37, 39–42, 45, 48.  Rather than plead 
facts creating a fact issue concerning affirmative fraudulent concealment and potential 
tolling of this date, Plaintiff instead sought to invoke an exception to facial untimeliness 
with nothing but a bare legal conclusion.17  R.00146 at ¶ 108.  This should have resulted 
in dismissal of all claims against Intermountain, rather than an invitation for Plaintiff to 
begin fishing for unalleged, possible affirmative fraudulent concealment (something she 
should have been aware of before filing her Complaint).   
It is settled Utah law that after alleging a facially untimely claim, a plaintiff has 
the burden to come forward and allege a reason her complaint is timely.  Tucker, 2002 
UT 54, ¶ 9; Young Resources, 2018 UT App 99, ¶ 31; Mast, 2009 UT App 162, at *1 n.2; 
Lowery, 2004 UT App 182, at *1; see also Bivens, 2017 UT 67, ¶ 54.18  Plaintiff has not 
                                                          
17 Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that her claims fit within section 78B-3-404(2)(b)’s 
narrow exception is an explicit admission that she bears the burden to plead a tolling 
exception under § 78B-3-404(2)(b)—something the district court correctly found she 
failed to do, but incorrectly held did not compel dismissal of her FAC.   
18 Plaintiff cited no contrary Utah or other law in the district court.  Plaintiff’s and the 
district court’s reliance on cases like Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., Inc., 2005 
UT App 325, ¶ 6, 122 P.3d 891, is misplaced, because in that case, and the others cited, 
an affirmative defense was not apparent on the face of the plaintiff’s own allegations.  
Indeed, in Zoumadakis, the court recognized that the general rule that complaints do not 
need to anticipate affirmative defenses has no application when “the allegations of the 
complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such as 
when a complaint plainly reveals that an action is untimely under the governing statute of 
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done so, and the district court’s decision allowing her claims to survive dismissal is legal 
error and should be reversed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALLEGATIONS 
OF FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT UNDER UTAH CODE § 78B-3-
404(2)(b) NEED NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 9(c). 
 
The district court correctly held, in three separate written orders, that Plaintiff’s 
Complaint and FAC allege nothing more than a bare legal conclusion of “affirmative 
fraudulent concealment” against Intermountain.  R.00736; R.00753–56; R.00311–13 
(“Defendants maintain that these new allegations [in the FAC] are still insufficient under 
Rule 9. … In fact, those additional allegations appear to be conclusory in nature without 
any measure of particularity.”).  Yet, because of the misapplication of Rule 12 addressed 
above, the district court found Plaintiff was not obligated to plead such facts, let alone do 
so with particularity.  This failure to require the UHMA’s repose exception to be pled 
with particularity runs counter to Utah law, which requires that allegations of fraudulent 
concealment under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) not only be pled, but be pled with particularity.  
See Chapman v. Primary Children’s Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1185–86 (Utah 1989); see 
also Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, 2009 WL 3490974 (dismissing malpractice 
claims under Rule 9 for failure to plead affirmative fraudulent concealment with 
particularity).  Contrary to the district court’s opinion, for Plaintiff’s remaining claims to 
survive, she must plead facts demonstrating the UHMA’s affirmative fraudulent 
concealment exception is applicable, and the allegations must satisfy Rule 9(c).   
                                                          
limitations.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005)) 
(emphasis added). 
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A. Rule 9(c) is applicable to any allegations of fraud, including allegations 
of affirmative fraudulent concealment under the UHMA. 
 
Rule 9(c) states that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”  Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c) 
(emphasis added).  The rule’s plain language makes no exception based on whether the 
allegation is in an affirmative claim, a counterclaim, a defense, or a response to a defense.  
Id.  And Utah courts read procedural rules like Rule 9(c) according to the “ordinary and 
accepted meaning” of the words used.  Drew, 2011 UT 15, ¶ 16.  In Williams v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982), this Court held that Rule 9 applies to every 
allegation of fraud, including those found in affirmative defenses: 
The Rule 9(b) requirement should not be understood as limited to 
allegations of common law fraud.  The purpose of that requirement dictates 
that it reach all circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of 
misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term 
“fraud” in its broadest dimension. 
Id. at 972.19 
                                                          
19 See also State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, ¶ 22, 282 P.3d 66 (Rule 9(c) is not limited 
to allegations of common law fraud and the rule’s purpose dictates that it reach all 
circumstances where a pleader alleges misrepresentations, omissions or other deceptions 
covered by the term fraud in its broadest dimension); Otsuka Elecs. (USA, Inc.) v. 
Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (applying Rule 9 to 
fraud affirmative defense); GDE Constr., Inc. v. Leavitt, 294 P.3d 567, 571 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2012) (applying Rule 9 to mistake affirmative defense).  Apparently recognizing 
Rule 9 applies to all allegations of fraud irrespective of the procedural posture of the 
pleading, Plaintiff originally did not argue that her allegation of affirmative fraudulent 
concealment was not subject to Rule 9.  See R.00525–33 (arguing compliance with Rule 
9).  Plaintiff argued Rule 9 might not apply to her fraudulent concealment allegations 
under § 78B-3-404 only after the district court’s sua sponte ruling regarding Rule 9’s 
application. 
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Utah and federal cases routinely apply Rule 9 when fraud is pled as a possible way 
around an affirmative defense.  For example, in Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 858 
(Utah 1983), a plaintiff sued after a car accident and the defendant asserted the 
affirmative defense of a prior release.  This Court held that in arguing the release was 
executed based upon “fraud,” the plaintiff was required, but failed to allege in the 
complaint, the elements of fraud under Rule 9.  Id. at 858. 
Most importantly, this Court has found that allegations of affirmative fraudulent 
concealment satisfying the UHMA’s repose exception must be pled with particularity.  
See Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1185–86.  In Chapman, this Court stated that allegations of 
affirmative fraudulent concealment asserted under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) (at the time 
designated § 78-14-4(1)(b)) must be made under Rule 9 and “mere conclusory 
[affirmative fraudulent concealment] allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a 
recitation of relevant surroundings, are insufficient to preclude dismissal or summary 
judgment.”  Id. (emphasis added).  This Court applied Rule 9 to the statute at issue 
here—§ 78B-3-404(2)(b)—and concluded that allegations of affirmative fraudulent 
concealment by Dr. Veasy, one of the defendant physicians, were sufficient, but such 
allegations against Dr. Myer, another defendant physician, were not.  Id.20 
                                                          
20 The trial court in Chapman granted summary judgment, finding that because matters 
outside the pleadings were considered, it was proper to view the matter as resolved under 
Rule 56.  Id. at 1182 n.1.  This Court noted the procedural history but it applied its 
analysis to allegations, and stated that a failure to comply with Rule 9 will result in 
“dismissal or summary judgment.”  Id. at 1186 (emphasis added). 
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Roth v. Pedersen is consistent with Chapman and addresses allegations that are 
indistinguishable from those made against Intermountain here.  2009 UT App 313.  In 
Roth, the Utah Court of Appeals cited Chapman and held that under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) a 
plaintiff who failed to allege that he consulted with a defendant about prior medical care 
could not have been affirmatively misled into a delayed filing, and thus has not stated a 
legally sufficient tolling allegation under Rule 9.  Id. at *3–4.21  Consequently, the 
plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed.  Id.  
Federal authorities also uniformly agree that Rule 9 applies to allegations of 
fraudulent concealment meant to plead around an affirmative defense to a facially 
untimely complaint.  The treatise this Court cited in Tucker, for example, makes clear 
allegations of fraudulent concealment meant to toll a limitations period “fall within the 
heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b).”  C. Wright & A. Miller, 5A Federal 
                                                          
21 In connection with his March 7, 2018 leave to amend ruling, the district court cited 
Roth and concluded that “[a]lthough the Court [of Appeals] separately addressed the 
fraudulent concealment exception to the statute of limitations, it appeared to be 
addressing Plaintiff’s alternative fraudulent concealment claim when it held that under 
Rule 9, that claim must be pled with particularity.”  R.00315.  In Roth, the Utah Court of 
Appeals used the word “claim” without stating whether it intended to reference an 
affirmative claim or an allegation of fraudulent concealment for tolling (a response to a 
defense).  2009 UT App 313, at *3.  In subsequently moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC, 
Intermountain supplied the district court with the appeal briefs in Roth.  See R.00393–
466.  Those briefs remove any ambiguity and demonstrate that no affirmative 
concealment claim was ever made in Roth, and the Utah Court of Appeals applied Rule 9 
to tolling allegations under § 78B-3-404(2)(b) that are indistinguishable from those made 
here against Intermountain.  Specifically, the plaintiff in Roth, as Plaintiff has tried to do 
with Intermountain, relied exclusively on non-disclosure allegations.  After these briefs 
were provided, Plaintiff has not asserted that the Roth opinion addresses an affirmative 
claim rather than possible tolling of the repose period due to affirmative fraud (i.e., a 
response to an affirmative defense), and has otherwise failed to distinguish Roth. 
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Practice and Procedure § 1297 (3rd ed. 2017) (superseding § 1357 from 2nd ed.).  
Additional treatises and federal law uniformly recognize Rule 9 applies to a plaintiff’s 
allegations of fraudulent concealment meant to toll a limitation or repose period.22 
B. Plaintiff’s remaining claims in the FAC fail to satisfy Rule 9(c). 
  
The district court correctly recognized that Plaintiff makes no allegations of 
affirmative fraudulent concealment because Plaintiff fails to allege Intermountain even 
interacted with her, let alone caused her to delay filing her claims through affirmative 
fraud.23  Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations against Intermountain are almost exclusively that 
                                                          
22 See 1 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts. § 7:57 (4th ed. 2017) (“[Rule 9] applies where 
fraudulent concealment is pleaded in anticipation of the affirmative defense of the statute 
of limitations.”); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 402 (2018) (a “plaintiff must allege 
… fraudulent concealment with distinctness and particularity.”); Id. § 420 (same); Ballen, 
23 F.3d at 336–37 (affirming dismissal because untimeliness was clear from the 
complaint’s facial allegations and concealment allegations were inadequately pled under 
Rule 9); Conerly, 623 F.2d at 119–20 (same); Summerhill, 637 F.3d at 879–80 (same); 
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88–89 (2nd Cir. 1983) (same); Gulley v. Pierce & 
Associates, P.C., 436 Fed. Appx. 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2011) (same). 
23 This stands in contrast to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Dr. Sorensen, whom the 
district court found had allegedly engaged in “affirmative misrepresentation at the outset” 
according to Plaintiff’s FAC, and that such an initial fraud allegation satisfies the 
UHMA’s fraudulent concealment exception.  R.00752.  This conclusion, though not 
required to support the district court’s correct finding that Plaintiff has failed to allege 
any affirmative fraud by Intermountain “with any degree of particularity,” R.00751, is 
inconsistent with Utah law.  This Court in Allred ex rel. Jensen v. Allred held that tolling 
fraud claims based on fraudulent concealment is appropriate only when the concealment 
act is separate from (and therefore subsequent to) the alleged fraud.  2008 UT 22, ¶ 37, 
182 P.3d 337 (“It would be circular to toll the statute of limitations … merely because the 
defendant commits fraud or breaches a fiduciary duty without some further showing that 
the defendant also concealed it from the plaintiff.” (emphasis added)).  State and federal 
courts routinely apply this principle from Allred to dispose of untimely claims, and 
applied properly in this case, it provides an independent basis for dismissal of Plaintiff’s 
claims against Intermountain.  See, e.g., Blackburn v. Blue Mtn. Women’s Clinic, 286 
Mont. 60, 75 (1997) (“[F]ailure to disclose [must be] an act separate from the alleged act 
of malpractice upon which the claim for professional negligence rests.”); Liddell v. First 
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of general disclosure that PFO closure “has not been found to reliably reduce migraines,” 
or at most, passive silence (“IHC made a deliberate and conscious decision not to inform 
patients that they may have had a medically unnecessary surgery”).  See, e.g., R.00130–
32 at ¶¶ 32–34 (emphasis added).  Despite the absence of any supporting fraud facts, 
Plaintiff alleges the bare legal conclusion that her claims against “Defendants” are saved 
from facial untimeliness under the UHMA’s narrow affirmative fraudulent concealment 
exception.  R.00146 at ¶ 108; State v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2019 UT App 31, ¶ 
19, -- P.3d – (relying on Rule 9(c) to affirm dismissal with prejudice of conclusory fraud 
claims “pleaded in the collective” against multiple defendants).   
Despite this, the district court found Rule 9 inapplicable to an “affirmative 
fraudulent concealment” allegation made in response to an affirmative defense.  R.00734.  
In doing so, the district court effectively barred the statute of repose defense from being 
raised under Rule 12(b)(6), something that is entirely inconsistent with Utah cases and 
the very purpose of Rule 9.  See supra Section II.A.  Rule 9 contains no such limitation, 
and its express language applies to every allegation of fraud, whether pled in an 
affirmative claim, in an affirmative defense, or in a response to an affirmative defense as 
Plaintiff attempts to do in paragraph 108 of her FAC. 
C. Fraud discovery is improper when a plaintiff cannot satisfy Rule 9(c). 
   
Utah and federal case law also recognize that a critical purpose of Rule 9 is to 
prevent fraud discovery from proceeding before fraud has been alleged with particularity, 
                                                          
Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 146 F. App’x 748, 751 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Plaintiffs must prove a 
subsequent affirmative act of fraudulent concealment to toll the limitations [period].”). 
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and the scope of such discovery thereby properly framed.  See Shah v. Intermountain 
Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App 261, ¶ 12, 314 P.3d 1079 (“[A] plaintiff alleging fraud 
must know what his claim is when he files it” and a fraud claim should “seek to redress 
… a wrong, not … find one”) (quoting Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 
F.2d 982, 990 (10th Cir. 1992) and Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607–08 (2nd Cir. 
1972)); Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 2015 UT App 19, ¶ 11, 344 P.3d 156 
(“Plaintiff’s assertion that they will ‘not know until discovery’ the specific 
misrepresentations made is precisely what Rule 9(b) seeks to prevent.”).   
Indeed, because the filing of the lawsuit itself evidences a plaintiff’s undisputed 
knowledge of his or her claims, a plaintiff alleging claims could not have been brought 
earlier because of a defendant’s fraudulent concealment must necessarily be in possession 
of the specific facts of such concealment.  This is particularly true here, where such 
concealment must be affirmative.  Otherwise, a plaintiff lacks the facts needed to bring 
the suit in the first instance.  Relieving a plaintiff of the burden to make such a showing 
runs counter to the purpose of Rule 9(c), which requires allegations of fraud to be pled 
with particularity, i.e., to keep the doors of discovery closed to fraud claims that are 
easily alleged, but difficult to prove.  Requiring specificity commits a plaintiff to a 
version of events that must at least appear plausible before being given the full powers of 
formal discovery to go in search of evidence to support allegations of such serious 
wrongdoing.    
Under this settled law, the district court erred in refusing to dismiss Plaintiff’s 
FAC, and Plaintiff should not be allowed to proceed with discovery regarding an unpled 
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fraud.  Utah and federal cases recognize that discovery in this context is simply improper.  
See cases cited supra; Caprin v. Simon Transp. Servs., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255 (D. 
Utah 2000) (“The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to prevent the filing of a complaint as a pretext 
for the discovery of unknown wrongs.”).  Accordingly, Intermountain requests that this 
Court reverse the district court’s decision misapplying Rule 12 and refusing to apply Rule 
9’s heightened pleading standards to Plaintiff’s allegations of affirmative fraudulent 
concealment under § 78B-3-404(2)(b).  The Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining 
claims with prejudice.  
CONCLUSION 
 Intermountain respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district court’s 
application of Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and dismiss 
as untimely under section 78B-3-404(1) all remaining claims against Intermountain with 
prejudice. 
 DATED this 18th day of March, 2019. 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW  
& BEDNAR PLLC 
 
 
  /s/  Jack T. Nelson     
      
Alan C. Bradshaw 
Chad R. Derum 
John (Jack) T. Nelson 
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ADDENDUM 
Contents: (1) Utah Code § 78B-3-404; (2) August 9, 2018 Order;  
(3) August 9, 2018 Discovery Order 
 
78B-3-404. Statute of limitations - Exceptions - Application.  
(1) A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced within two 
years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years 
after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.  
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1):  
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a 
foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall be 
barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of 
the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; or 
  
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from 
discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health 
care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged 
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should 
have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
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(3) The limitations in this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or 
other legal disability under Section 78B-2-108 or any other provision of the law. 
 
 
Rhome D. Zabriskie  
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC  
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604  
Tel: (801) 375-7680 
Fax: (801) 375-7686 
Email: rhomelawyer@yahoo.com 
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: August 09, 2018 /s/ BARRY LAWRENCE
10:29:54 AM District Court Judge




SHERMAN SORENSEN, M.D.; 
SORENSEN CARDIOVASCULAR 













This matter having come before the Court on May 25, 2018 before the Honorable Judge               
Barry Lawrence. Rand Nolen, David Hobbs, and Rhome Zabriskie appeared on behalf of             
Plaintiff Lisa Tapp. Alan Bradshaw and Jack Nelson appeared on behalf of Defendant IHC              
Health Services, Inc., and Michael Miller and Kathleen Abke appeared on behalf of Defendants              
Sherman Sorensen and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group. The matter before the Court was a             
hearing on Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.  
The Court notes the relevant procedural history. After plaintiff filed her Complaint, a             
motion to dismiss was filed, followed by a request to file an amended complaint. On February                
20, 2018, the Court held argument on the motion to amend and rejected defendants’ futility               
arguments in an Order dated March 7, 2018. After the Amended Complaint, was filed another               
set of motions to dismiss were filed; they were heard on May 14, 2018. The Court announced its                  
ruling in a telephone conference on May 25, 2018. That ruling is reflected herein; but to the                 
extent that ruling differs from this Order, the oral ruling should control.  
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Having considered the motions, the Court dismisses the fraud/misrepresentation claims          
against IHC Health Services, Inc. and the conspiracy claim as to all Defendants. Other than that,                
the Court denies the motions, leaving the negligence claims against Dr. Sorensen, the negligence              
claims against IHC Health Services, Inc., and the fraud/misrepresentation claims against Dr.            
Sorensen. 
The Court concludes that it cannot rule on the statute of limitation/repose defense based              
on the pleadings. Plaintiff is not obligated to plead with particularity in her complaint facts in                
response to the statute of limitation/repose defense. The Plaintiff is not obligated to meet a               
heightened pleading requirement relating to facts that would serve to defeat an impending             
defense. ​Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., Inc. ​, 2005 UT App 325, ¶ 6, 122 P.3d 891,                 
893–94 (“the burden of pleading the inapplicability of [privilege] is not initially on the plaintiff,               
and it is not incumbent on the plaintiff or party filing a complaint to anticipate an affirmative                 
defense which the answer may disclose”).  
The Court is not persuaded by the Defendants’ argument to the contrary, and there is a                
distinction for cases where the complaint is “facially invalid” or untimely. The Court reads              
Defendants’ cited cases as standing for the proposition that when all the facts necessary to               
determine an affirmative defense are stated in the complaint, then the affirmative defense can be               
resolved in a Rule 12 motion. That is not the case here where the facts of fraudulent concealment                  
are not in the complaint and can’t be unless the issue is before the Court in full.  
In ​Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. ​, 2002 UT 54, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d 947, ​all of the                              
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applicable dates were in the complaint and so the court ruled as a matter of law. There was no                                     
assertion of a defense to the defense of statute of limitation, and so it was not inappropriate for                                   
the court to rule. Again, it appears to the Court that all facts necessary to decide the Rule 12                                     
motion were in the complaint, which again is a far cry from this case. ​Van De Grift v. State ​, 2013                                  
UT 11, 299 P.3d 1043 was dismissed on immunity grounds because there is immunity for claims                
that arise based on fraud and the complaint alleged facts of fraud. ​Bivens v. Salt Lake City Corp. ​,                  
2017 UT 67 involved exhaustion of remedies, which is a jurisdictional issue. There the complaint               
made clear that there was no exhaustion. And, in footnote the ​Bivens ​court said: “We do not hold                  
today that a plaintiff’s complaint must affirmatively plead exhaustion of legal remedies.” And in              
Lowery v. Brigham Young University​, 2004 UT App 182, the complaint on its face reflected               
when the plaintiff discovered his claim, which meant that as a matter of law, the discovery rule                 
could not apply and, therefore, the court could rule on the pleadings. None of these cases stand                 
for the proposition that a plaintiff in the first instance has the obligation to state facts necessary                 
to defeat a statute of limitations defense at all, let alone with a degree of particularity. The issue                  
of whether the plaintiff can prove fraudulent concealment required under § 78B-3-404 will have              
to be based upon what we learn factually in discovery and to be decided at summary judgment or                  
at trial. Accordingly, the Court ​DENIES all of the statute of limitations issues raised by the                
Defendants.  
The Sorensen Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be consolidated into one            
medical malpractice claim. While the ​Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does have a broad              
definition of what a malpractice claim is for procedural purposes, the Court is not aware of any                 
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authority that prevents a plaintiff from asserting alternative facts of fraud or negligence against              
Dr. Sorensen, and the elements of each would have to be proven at trial. However, the Court                 
notes that it appears that there are multiple claims of negligence and multiple claims of fraud,                
and The Court will not dismiss those at this time. The plaintiff is certainly entitled to pursue its                  
claims. But ultimately at trial, there will be one negligence claim against Dr. Sorensen and one                
fraud claim and if the standard of care encompasses various things that’s fine, but those are not                 
separate claims. Accordingly, the Court ​DENIES​ the Sorensen Defendants’ motion. 
IHC Health Services, Inc.’s motion to dismiss the misrepresentation claims is                     
GRANTED​. It is important to note that there is a distinction here between the fraud associated                               
with the 2008 surgery and any alleged fraud that took place thereafter that is relevant to statute of                                   
limitation/repose. The allegations of ​IHC Health Services, Inc.’s fraud in inducing Ms. Tapp to                        
have surgery are non-existent. There is nothing but conclusory statements where the plaintiff                         
lumps the “defendants” in together and there is not one fact in the complaint that would support                                 
that IHC Health Services, Inc. was somehow involved in a fraud in 2008. There is no fact stated                                   
in the complaint that even alleges, let alone with any degree of particularity​, as required under                               
Rule 9, U.R.C.P., that IHC Health Services, Inc. was involved in a fraud on Plaintiff in 2008. So                                   
that claim against IHC Health Services, Inc. is ​DISMISSED​. The fraud claim against Dr.                           
Sorensen will survive and the motion ​DENIED​. There are ample allegations of facts supporting                           
this fraudulent inducement theory in 2008 by Dr. Sorensen. But there is absolutely nothing                           
demonstrating any fraud by IHC Health Services, Inc. or any sort of illegal conduct or wrong by                                 
IHC Health Services, Inc. and the predicate for a conspiracy claim has not been alleged. There                               
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are no facts alleged against IHC Health Services, Inc. of fraud and conspiracy at the time the                                 
surgery was done. 
The conspiracy claim, like the fraud claims, is governed by Rule 9 and Rule 9 requires a                                 
showing of particularity. ​Williams v. State Farm ​, 656 P.2d 966 (1982); ​Coroles v. Sabey ​, 2003                             
UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (2003); ​Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Worthington ​, 2015 UT App 19,                                   
344 P.3d 156. Having dismissed fraud claims against IHC Health Services, Inc. the Court is                             
compelled to dismiss the conspiracy claim between the Defendants as well. (Having dismissed                         
the underlying predicate for the conspiracy claim (i.e., the fraud claim), there can be no                             
conspiracy claim as a matter of law.)​. The Court ​GRANTS Defendants’ motions as to                           
conspiracy and ​DISMISSES​ the conspiracy claim against all Defendants. 
In summary, the Court: 
GRANTS IHC Health Services, Inc.’s motion as to the misrepresentation claims and            
DISMISSES ​ the Third; Fifth; and Sixth Claims for Relief against IHC Health Services, Inc.;  
GRANTS the Defendants’ motions as to the conspiracy claim and ​DISMISSES the Seventh             
Claim for Relief against all Defendants; and otherwise 
DENIES​ the motions to dismiss.  
***Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date 
and seal at the top of the first page*** 
-------------------------------------------​END OF DOCUMENT​-------------------------------------------- 
Approved as to form: 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM 
 
/s/ Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of David Hobbs) 
David Hobbs 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
 
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR 
 
 
/s/ Jack T. Nelson  
Alan C. Bradshaw 
John T. (Jack) Nelson 
Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc. 
 
STRONG & HANNI 
 
 
/s/ Jack T. Nelson (signed with permission on behalf of Michael J. Miller) 
Michael J. Miller 
Attorneys for Sorensen Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that that a true and exact copy of the foregoing has been served on the following                   
via email on 31st day of July 2018: 
 
David Hobbs 
ZABRISKIE LAW FIRM, LLC  
899 North Freedom Blvd, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604  
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
 
Alan C. Bradshaw 
John (Jack) T. Nelson 
Manning, Curtis, Bradshaw & Bednar PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1300 






Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc. 
 
Michael J. Miller 
Strong & Hanni 
102 South 200 East, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT  84111 
mmiller@strongandhanni.com 
 
Attorney for Defendants Sherman Sorensen, M.D. and Sorensen Cardiovascular Group 
 
/s/ Jack T. Nelson  
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